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Increased market access from Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) promised by policy makers is often 
diluted by preferential rules of origin (ROO).  This paper discusses two policy options -- one 
direct, and one indirect -- with regard to limiting the impact of NAFTA ROO on trade, and 
illustrates the impact on GDP and welfare of these options using a computable general 
equilibrium methodology.  The first (direct) option, moving toward a North American Customs 
Union (CU) instead of the current NAFTA, would basically eliminate the need for preferential 
ROO among members of the CU.  The second (indirect) policy option is to pursue multilateral 
trade negotiations and reduce MFN tariffs towards zero.  In this context, NAFTA ROO would 
lack both relevance and impact, even if they remained “on the books”, because tariff preference 
utilization among NAFTA members would virtually disappear. The current stalemate at the WTO 
Doha round suggests that a North American CU remains a serious policy option.  However, the 
erosion of NAFTA tariff preferences since the phase-in of the Uruguay round has also reduced 
the distortionary impacts of NAFTA ROO, somewhat limiting the gains that a CU could bring. 
 
Keywords: Trade Agreement; Customs Union; Rules of Origin; Multilateral Free Trade 
Computable General Equilibrium Modeling. 




L’accès accru des marchés, résultant des accords de libre-échange (ALE), et promit par les 
politiciens, est souvent dilué par les règles d’origine préférentielles (RO).  Ce papier envisage 
deux options politiques – une directe, et une indirecte – qui pourraient diminuer l’impact 
négatifs des RO sur le commerce, et illustre les impacts économiques de ces deux options sur le 
PIB et le bien-être économique en utilisant une méthodologie d’équilibre général calculable.  La 
première option, adopter une union douanière nord américaine (UD) plutôt que l’ALENA actuel, 
éliminerait les RO préférentielles entre pays membres de l’UD.  La seconde option est de 
poursuivre les négociations multilatérales et réduire les tarifs «  MFN  » à zéro.  Dans ce 
contexte, les RO de l’ALENA perdraient de facto leur pertinence même si elles restaient 
« inscrites dans les annexes de l’ALENA », puisque l’utilisation des préférences tarifaires entre 
pays membres de l’ALENA disparaîtrait.  L’impasse actuelle de la ronde de Doha suggère 
qu’une UD nord américaine reste une option sérieuse de politique.  Cependant l’érosion des 
préférences tarifaires depuis la fin de la ronde de l’Uruguay a également réduit les effets 
distortionaires des RO de l’ALENA, limitant quelque peu les gains qu’une UD puisse apporter.    
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 1.  Introduction 
 
In a recent article, Robert Pastor (2008) ironically refers to the “North American 
game of Scrabble” which, since 2001, leads political leaders of Canada, Mexico and the 
U.S. to devise intergovernmental committees, meeting periodically to “spell new 
acronyms that purport to be initiatives”, and, with great abandon, to promptly discard 
them.  Table 1 gives a few of these acronymic initiatives in NAGOS
® (The North 
American Game of Scrabble): NAEC (North American Economic Community), P4P 
(Partnership for Prosperity), FAST (Free and Secure Trade), PIP (Partners in Protection), 
C-TPAT (Customs-Trade Partnerships Against Terrorism), IBETS (Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams), ACE (Automated Commercial Environment), NACC (North 
American Competitiveness Council), and SPP (Security and Prosperity Partnership of 
North America).  
Meanwhile, Pastor claims that if you measure progress by examining the growth 
in trade, the reduction in wait times at the borders, and the public support for integration, 
all of these initiatives have failed miserably.  For him, what is lacking is a North 
American vision “based on the simple premise that each country benefits from its 
neighbors’ success and each is diminished by their problems or setbacks”.  Such a vision 
stimulates “a new consciousness, a new way of thinking about one’s neighbors and about 
the continental agenda [so that] Americans, Canadians, and Mexicans can be nationals 
and North American at the same time”.  This vision of North America, according to 
Pastor, could evolve starting with a customs union (CU) and a common team of customs 
and border guards to man the borders and the continental perimeters, thereby eliminating 
the costly and cumbersome rules of origin (ROO) regulations, allowing all legitimate   1
goods to move seamlessly across the borders, and permitting border officials to 
concentrate on stopping drugs and terrorists.  To do this the three governments would 
need to negotiate a common external tariff (CET).   
The exchange on who dislikes NAFTA more, between senators Obama and 
Clinton, the two leading Democratic candidates of the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign, 
has left a bitter taste in the mouths of Canadians, and having a constructive view from an 
American on the future of North America and the need to replace a bad U.S. neighbor 
policy is refreshing.  But what’s in there for Canadians?   
The current stalemate at the WTO Doha round suggests that, for Canadian trade 
policy makers, a CU that also liberalizes ROO is indeed an alternative that should not be 
dismissed too quickly in a renewed agenda of North American cooperation.   However, 
the debate on ROO liberalization per se is often obscured by the level of technicalities of 
these rules.  One objective of the paper is therefore to shed some light on the ‘forest’ 
behind the ‘tree’ of legal and technical details of these rules and to highlight key 
ingredients needed to gauge the economic impact of liberalizing ROO using a 
computable general equilibrium methodology.   
Furthermore, the paper clarifies why we do need these rules in a free trade area 
(FTA), why we would not in a CU, and why these rules would be virtually irrelevant in a 
freer multilateral trade environment, and offers new evidence on the magnitude of the 
economic benefits for Canada, of these policy options.  Although we have no intention to 
reduce a vision for a North American agenda to a mere analysis of economic costs and 
benefits, trade negotiators might be interested in these results, we believe, at least as a 
starting point of a renewed positive agenda of North American cooperation.    2
The first option is to envisage a move to a North American CU.  Policy makers 
might want to consider this option because CUs are superior to FTAs essentially since 
CUs do not require preferential ROO.  Although larger gains would have been obtained 
in the 1990s by moving directly to a North American CU, potential economic gains from 
switching to a CU from the current NAFTA regime remain substantial.   
The second policy option is to pursue multilateral trade negotiations within the 
WTO and reduce most favored nations (MFN) tariffs towards zero.  This second option 
makes NAFTA ROO lacking both relevance and impact, even if they remain “on the 
books”, mainly because tariff preference utilization among NAFTA members would 
virtually vanish (and with it the FTA).   
Although not discussed further in this paper, there is a third often-mentioned 
policy option with regard to ROO, based on simplification or harmonization of NAFTA 
ROO between sectors or across preferential trade agreements.   It seems reasonable 
enough to suggest an across the board standard instead of the current heterogeneous rules 
across sectors (e.g., NAFTA triple transformation test in the textile/apparel sectors or the 
62.5% test in the automobile sector). In practice, however, as argued by Destler (2006), 
harmonization across sectors would be difficult to achieve on a large scale simply 
because these rules resulted from hardly-disputed sector-specific negotiations and that 
their current settings matter a great deal to producers.   ROO should not be viewed as a 
deal between nations but instead as a deal between private business interests and 
governments that needed to obtain their support in the legislative battle.  Current research 
on harmonization of ROO across FTAs (e.g., Cornejo and Harris, 2007, Gasiorek, Augier 
and Lai-Tong, 2007) has the merit to clarify the functioning of ROO by precising   3
concepts such as “diagonal”, “triangular” or “multilateralizing” cumulation of ROO.  
However, at this stage, it remains to be seen whether trade negotiators will be able to 
pursue this route in a significant manner.      
  The rest of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 discusses some key features of 
FTAs and CUs and gives some reasons behind the recent backlash on ROO.   Section 3 
offers a graphical approach of the challenge of capturing the impact of ROO 
liberalization in a computable general equilibrium model.  Section 4 illustrates the 
general equilibrium impacts of respectively, moving to a CU which also liberalizes ROO, 
and moving towards a multilateral free trade world that makes preferential ROO obsolete.  
Finally, Section 5 concludes by reviewing the policy options for Canada given the current 
stalemate at the WTO Doha round.                 
2.  FTAs, CUs, and ROO  
In economic literature, a CU is the second level of regional integration following 
a FTA and involves (as in a FTA) the eventual elimination of all tariffs between member 
countries, but unlike a FTA, also establishes a common external trade policy, in particular 
by adjusting all tariffs external to the CU to a common level.   In a FTA, however, the 
members maintain their individual MFN tariffs that they impose on countries outside the 
agreement.    
As a result, a CU requires members to negotiate a common trade policy and a 
CET with respect to non-member countries, while a FTA requires negotiating measures 
such as preferential ROO, to avoid trade deflection.  Trade deflection -- a modification of 
trade flows between the rest of the world and the members of the FTA -- occurs when a 
non-member agent transits goods through the FTA member-country with the lower-  4
external tariff and then transships duty-free (or with preferential treatment) to the final 
destination.  To eliminate the incentive for trade deflection, preferential ROO are 
negotiated among members of the FTA.  These rules determine which goods have 
“origin” in member countries and thus are eligible for duty-free (or preferential) 
treatment when crossing partners’ borders, and which goods are not as they are simply 
being transshipped through, or undergoing only minor transformations in a member 
country.
1 
However, FTAs also generate distortionary effects that lead member countries to 
purchase less from the rest of the world and more from other members in order to fulfill 
the ROO and obtain the tariff preference (Krishna and Krueger, 1995).  Therefore, as 
suggested long ago by Krueger (1995), CUs are Pareto superior to FTA because the 
establishment of a CET in a CU would also remove the incentives for trade deflection 
and therefore eliminates both the need for preferential ROO and their distortionary 
impact on the economy and competitiveness of firms.
2 Thus, preferential ROO are 
typically absent from a CU arrangement and movements of goods within a CU are not 
based on their “originating status” but on the principle of “free circulation”. 
Even if ROO are required in a FTA, there has been a recent backlash on these 
rules. Why?  U.S. trade negotiators started to pursue extensive FTAs negotiation in the 
1980s and the 1990s and they looked for particularized benefits they could offer 
important industries in exchange for their support.
3  Industries looked for ways to gain 
advantage within the new economics of globalization.
4  ROO was the ideal instrument to 
meet the needs of both.  The “success” of this strategy can be measured by the 
overwhelming positive response of foreign leaders, which resulted, as illustrated in   5
Figure 1, in a pandemic of overlapping FTAs in America, and across the world.  
According to Pomfret (2007), this positive response reflects that many foreign political 
leaders appear to take a talk-is-cheap attitude to trade agreements, happy to sign them at 
summit meetings and leave the details to lower officials who might bury the agreement 
when unpleasant consequences seem likely or political alliances shift.   
The “spaghetti bowl” of regional FTAs is by now a well established culinary 
analogy to the visual effect of Figure 1 and of many others figures drawn for different 
regions in the world.  One outcome of these overlapping FTAs is the ensuing 
proliferation of ROO. These rules of Byzantine complexity are often inconsistent across 
FTAs, opaque, and costly.  Although the European Union (EU), in principle, does not 
impose preferential ROO among its members (as it is also a CU), it does have ROO 
regimes with countries external to the union and which have signed FTAs with the EU.  
Both the ROO of NAFTA and the (external) ROO of the EU are, according to 
Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004), highly restrictive, and the recent proliferation of 
inter-regional agreements are important transmission channels for the diffusion of these 
two dominating and costly models (Garay and De Lombaerde, 2004).  
A few observers have highlighted some unpleasant consequences of these rules.  
Whereas, as said above, the economic justification for ROO is to prevent trade deflection 
inherent in FTAs because member countries, unlike in a CU, do not harmonize their 
external tariff by establishing a CET, Krishna (2005) argues that they are increasingly 
used for protectionist purposes.  This has led to the underutilization of trade preferences 
and eventually to the questioning of the FTAs alleged market access argument.  
Secondly, as already mentioned, preferential ROO also have a distortionary impact when   6
they induce firms to substitute cheaper non-originating materials for intermediary goods 
originating from the zone (Krueger, 1995).  Thirdly, the political economy of FTAs is 
likely to be less conducive to (future) multilateral trade liberalization than a CU – a 
stumbling-block in the terminology of Bhagwati (1993) – because ROO favor FTA 
intermediary producers relative to more efficient world producers so that they will 
constitute an additional opposition to any moves to globally freer trade.   Keeping up with 
our previous culinary image, liberalizing ROO is not unlike removing the sauce from the 
FTA spaghetti bowl: an arguably difficult task.  Finally, the international segmentation of 
production in which intermediate inputs are traded and transformed into more processed 
intermediate inputs, which are then moved across borders to the next stage of production, 
has led to a growing share of parts and components in total exports (World Bank, 2005).  
ROO may therefore impede FTAs firms in taking advantage of the global production 
chains and this might also have negative impacts on inward foreign direct investment. 
However, as long as the cost of ROO is not made transparent, there is little hope 
for generating much policy interest in proposals for liberalizing ROO and for viable 
alternatives.  Therefore, there is a need for new and detailed analyses of the costs of 
existing preferential ROO.   
3.  ROO: Modeling and Calibration Challenges 
While computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses have been used for many 
years to illustrate the economic and welfare impacts of liberalizing tariff, there has been 
virtually no attempt to gauge the impact of liberalizing ROO using a CGE methodology.  
For example, Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001) measure the impact of moving from 
NAFTA to a North American CU but typically limit their CGE experiment to the   7
adoption of a CET.  Although Ghosh and Rao (2005) stress the relevance of estimating 
the cost of ROO when measuring the economic effect of a potential North American CU, 
their impact is not captured adequately in their CGE analysis because they do not model 
ROO explicitly nor do they calibrate their model to reflect the presence of ROO 
distortions in the benchmark data set.
5  Although ROO might somewhat offset the impact 
of tariff liberalization, this does not imply, as their analysis suggests, that the economic 
effects of a ROO is “equivalent” to a tariff.   
Therefore, more research is needed and CGE modelers could benefit from a 
simple methodological framework illustrating how to capture the essence of ROO into a 
CGE model.  Georges (2008a) has used a calibration procedure of a multi-country multi-
sector CGE model that permits to evaluate the economic impact of liberalizing NAFTA 
ROO.  The objective of this section is to make this procedure more explicit, using a 
graphical representation of a simplified calibration procedure in order to highlight some 
key ingredients needed to gauge the economic impact of liberalising ROO.    
Assume a firm that belongs to a FTA which, without loss of generality, will be 
referred to as NAFTA.  Suppose that the firm, when using an intermediary good X might 
either purchases the intermediary good from NAFTA, Nafta X , or from outside 
NAFTA, nonNafta X , at existing prices PNafta and PnonNafta.  The firm has access to a constant 
return to scale technology to produce the composite intermediary X using Nafta X  
and nonNafta X , and one isoquant X is depicted by the curve in Figure 2.
6 Assume also that 
the firm must satisfy a ROO constraint that has to be met to obtain origin.  From an 
analytical viewpoint the basic effect of a ROO is to raise the production costs of the good 
that meets the binding ROO (Francois 2005, Krishna 2005).      8
Suppose that at existing intermediary prices, an unconstrained firm chooses the 
input mix at the point labeled 1 using Nafta X and  nonNafta X  so that their ratio equals α0.  The 
lowest cost to obtain X  is given by the height of the isocost through point 1 and this cost 




where Px is the minimum unit cost of the composite intermediary.  A binding ROO 






 α0, then only points on or above the ray from the origin with slope α and on 
the isoquant would be feasible.  In this case, costs are minimized by choosing the input 
mix given by point 2 and these costs, if the ROO are met, are given by the height of the 






rule is the minimum unit cost of the composite 
intermediary given the binding ROO.  Observe that a binding ROO acts like an implicit 
tax on the use of non-NAFTA intermediaries and an implicit subsidy on the use of 
NAFTA intermediaries.  The implicit price distortion can be viewed graphically by 
comparing the slope of the isocost through point 1 with the slope of the price line (not 
drawn) tangent to the isoquant at point 2.  More restrictive ROO would correspond to 
higher values for α, a steeper ray from the origin, and a higher minimum unit cost of 
production.   
It is simple enough to realize that if a firm is strictly constrained by a ROO and is 
effectively at point 2 in Figure 2, then, removing the ROO would lead the firm to select 
the input combination given by point 1, increasing its purchase of non-NAFTA 
intermediary good and decreasing the purchase of NAFTA intermediary goods, which   9
would lower its total spending on intermediary goods. In effect, eliminating ROO implies 
eliminating the implicit tax on the use of non-NAFTA intermediaries and the implicit 
subsidy on the use of NAFTA intermediaries.  
The simplicity of the argument is, however, deceptive, and Figure 3 illustrates 
this.  Suppose for example that a data set is available on the chosen intermediary bundle 
at specific prices in a specific reference year and that this choice is given by point 2.  (For 






.  The ray’s relative steepness reflects an observed bias for 
NAFTA versus non-NAFTA intermediary goods.  However, we should not necessarily 
attribute this bias to a binding NAFTA ROO, that is, it is not because a firm utilizes 
intensively NAFTA intermediary goods in its production process that this necessarily 






 α with XNafta and XnonNafta observed in the benchmark data set, then α is 
simply the numerical value of this ratio and should not be taken as an institutional 
parameter reflecting the ROO restrictiveness per se (say, x% of spending on intermediary 
good must be of NAFTA origin).
7 
This naturally leads to the challenge of positioning the relevant isoquant in Figure 
3, or, in other words, to calibrate the distribution parameters of the production function 
that links the composite intermediary good X to its input mix ( Nafta X , nonNafta X ) while 
assuming a cost minimizing behavior of the firm that is potentially constrained by a 
ROO.     10
For illustration, let us assume that such a technology is given by a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function:  
    () ()











η η nonNafta nonNafta Nafta Nafta X X X                      (1) 
where  Nafta η and  nonNafta η are the distribution parameters and σ is the Armington elasticity 
of substitution between NAFTA and non-NAFTA intermediaries.  The crucial 
assumption that must be made is whether the bias for NAFTA intermediary goods in 
Figure 3 is due, in part or entirely, to a binding ROO.  For example, if ROO distortions 
that might have let the firm to select the combination given by point 2 are not introduced 
in the analysis (because, say, these rules are not the subject of the study), then the CGE 
modeler will calibrate the CES function by fixing ηNafta and ηnonNafta to (
o o
nonNafta Nafta η η , ) in 
order to position the isoquant
o η X at the tangency point with the isocost line at point 2.
8 
On the other hand, the modeler might assume that the observed bias at point 2 is 





 ≥ α and which induced the firm to change the production process by 
substituting nonNafta X  for  Nafta X in order to fulfill the ROO and benefit from the preferential 
NAFTA tariff when exporting the final good to its NAFTA partners.  The calibration 
procedure must therefore be revised accordingly so that if point 2 observed in the data 
reflects an optimal behavior under constraint of a distortionary ROO, then, removing the 
distortion should induce some re-allocation out of  Nafta X and into nonNafta X .  Thus, the 
modeler must re-parameterize the CES function (1) by fixing the parameters (ηNafta,   11




Nafta η η , ), therefore positioning the isoquant to, 
say:
1 rule Xη or
2 rule Xη .  These specific re-parameterizations suggest that, ceteris paribus, 
the removal of ROO would push the intermediary good bundle from point 2 to either 
point 1 or point 3.   
Choosing between many different possible re-parameterizations is, therefore, a 
key challenge of this analysis.  As Figure 3 illustrates, the indeterminacy between the two 
isoquants --
1 rule Xη  or 
2 rule Xη -- is the reason why a crucial additional assumption must 
be imposed in order to disentangle ROO distortions (that are only implicitly present in the 
data set) versus any other factors that might have led the firm to choose point 2.   
The proposed solution to the indeterminacy is as follows.  As seen above, when 
ROO are distortionary there is an efficiency cost, which translates into an increase in the 
minimum unit cost of production in comparison to what it would be without the ROO.  
Therefore, we can argue that the ROO has increased the firm’s minimum spending on 
intermediary goods by a pre-specified percentage θ ≥ 0, so that for example:   
     X Px X Px
Rule ) 1 ( θ + = ,  
or 
     ) 1 ( θ + = Px Px
Rule ,                         (2) 
where 
Rule Px andPx , as defined before, are the unit costs of production of the composite 
intermediary good X, respectively with and without ROO, and where θ ≥ 0 is the 
efficiency cost of the ROO.  The parameterθ  provides a measure of the distance between 
the two relevant isocost lines as shown in Figure 3.  The assumption that  0
1 > =θ θ    12
corresponds to the parameterization leading to the isoquant
1 rule Xη so that removing ROO 
in the counterfactual pushes the firm from point 2 to point 1.  If, on the other hand, the 
efficiency cost of ROO is assumed to be 
1 2 θ θ θ > = , then, the parameterized isoquant 
is
2 rule Xη and removing ROO in the counterfactual pushes the firm (all else the same) 
from point 2 to point 3.   
Finally, suppose that  0
0 = =θ θ  so that it is assumed that the initial introduction 
of ROO did not increase the costs of production, or, in other words, did not induce the 
firm to change its method of production (say, the ROO was not binding). Then, the high 
bias in favor of NAFTA intermediary goods as is observed at point 2 should not be 
attributed to ROO but to other (undetermined) factors.  In this case, the calibration 
procedure would automatically set the shadow price of the ROO constraint equal to 0 and 
this would lead to a parameterized CES function given by 
o η X in Figure 3.  Removing 
ROO in the counterfactual would therefore have no impact on the firm’s choice between 
NAFTA and non NAFTA intermediary goods and the firm would continue to optimally 
choose the allocation given by point 2.   
To implement the method described above we need information on the parameter 
θ  -- the efficiency cost of the ROO expressed in percentage increase of the unit cost.  
This is an external parameter that must be estimated.  Although there is very little 
information on the exact magnitude of this efficiency cost, the “participation constraint” 
approach [Cadot et al. (2002) and Anson et al. (2005)] might be a good starting point.  
This literature closely links the cost of ROO with tariff preferences [i.e., the differences 
between MFN tariff and preferential (NAFTA) tariff]. According to this approach, the   13
terms of a FTA are set to leave partners close to or on their participation constraint (i.e., 
close to being indifferent between signing and not signing) so that there is a 
substitutability between tariff rates and ROO restrictiveness in terms of their impact on 
net revenues for exporters (larger net revenues due to deeper tariff preferences are just 
offset by the cost of more restrictive ROO).  This approach leads to proxy the efficiency 
cost θ of the ROO with the tariff preference that can be obtained when exporting the final 
good to a NAFTA partner.  This proxy is an upper bound to the cost of ROO, but the 
approach implies that it is not far off the true estimate because member countries are 
assumed to be “close to”, if not “on” their participation constraint.
9  
   As said previously, it is unlikely that ROO are the only factors explaining the 
high biases (the high values for α).  Therefore, to re-emphasize, the key insight that is 
proposed is to consider that both the introduction of ROO and other (undetermined) 
factors have pushed the economy towards the high NAFTA-content that is observed in 
data.  To disentangle ROO from other factors, it is assumed that ROO per se increased 
the unit cost of production in the order of magnitude θ (≥ 0) given by the appropriately 
weighted tariff preference as suggested above.  With the information on parameter θ, the 
technological (distribution) parameters can be calibrated as discussed previously.   
Although estimating θ  is a key issue in order to capture the effects of NAFTA’s 
ROO, we need to go one step further and to gauge the impact of removing ROO as part 
of a more general counterfactual experiment of moving to a CU.  The relevance of a 
general equilibrium framework to address the impact of removing ROO should be clear 
when we recall that a ROO acts as an implicit tax for the use of intermediary goods 
purchased outside NAFTA, an implicit subsidy to NAFTA firms for the use of   14
intermediary goods purchased within NAFTA, and (in the more global context of the 
paper and in the generalized version proposed in Georges 2008a) an implicit subsidy for 
the use of labor and capital.  Therefore, it is essential to take into account interactions 
between agents and repercussions on all markets in the economy following the 
elimination of ROO, and the knowledge of a sectoral θ  as a proxy for the efficiency cost 
of the ROO in that sector is only an initial step in understanding the general equilibrium 
impacts of removing ROO. 
4.  Simulation Results: CU versus Multilateral Free Trade Liberalization 
The calibration method outlined above has been formalized and introduced in a 
computable general equilibrium model (Georges, 2008a and 2008b).  In this model, the 
world economy consists of seven countries/regions composing two blocks, NAFTA 
versus non-NAFTA countries:  Canada, USA and Mexico (NAFTA), and Latin America, 
Mercosur, Europe, and the Rest of the World. All seven countries/regions are fully 
modeled.
10   
In this section, we use this model to evaluate and compare different counterfactual 
experiments:  1. The benefit we would have obtained if we had negotiated a CU instead 
of a FTA in the 1990s;  2. The impact of moving to a CU in the 2000s;  3. The impact of 
a multilateral free trade in the 1990s (instead of the hub and spoke North American 
system);  and 4. The impact of a multilateral free trade in the 2000s.  
As said above, had we negotiated a North American CU in the 1990s instead of 
NAFTA, then a North American CET would have been established while NAFTA 
preferential ROO would be virtually absent.  Therefore, in order to simulate the impact of   15
the counterfactual policy scenario of establishing a CU instead of NAFTA, we need to 
model both the adoption of a CET and the removal of NAFTA ROO.   
A ROO is an implicit subsidy on capital, labour, and NAFTA intermediary goods, 
but an implicit penalty on intermediary goods from the rest of the world.  Therefore, the 
main impact of removing ROO is the elimination of the implicit subsidies and penalties.  
This shock would reallocate efficiently the demand for factors of production in each 
sector of NAFTA countries, lowering NAFTA firms’ demand for capital, labour, and 
NAFTA intermediary goods, but increasing the demand for non-NAFTA intermediary 
goods.  The efficient reallocation of factors of production within NAFTA would also 
lower the unit cost of production in every sector of NAFTA countries. Therefore, 
Canadian real GDP would increase because resources would be used more efficiently.
11   
Had we negotiate a CU with the U.S., Canada would have gained a permanent 
(yearly) additional increase in GDP of 0.9% (see Figure 4) of which 0.7% would be due 
to the fact that a CU does not require ROO -- a magnitude corresponding to the 
continually-postponed Canada’s commitment to the U.N. target for development 
assistance to less developed countries, and 0.1% would be due to the adoption of a CET 
which has been set, in this experiment, equal to the U.S. MFN tariff in order to avoid 
protracted negotiations with the U.S. on the CET itself.
12   
The basic insight of Figure 4 is that the impact on GDP of liberalising ROO 
largely dominates the marginal impact of adopting a CET.  This is not surprising given 
the convergence of Canadian and U.S. MFN tariffs.  However, this shows that typical 
studies that assume away ROO when gauging the economic impact of a CU must be far 
off the true estimate and Figure 4 provides a magnitude of the mis-estimation in the   16
existing literature. Although a CU negotiation process with the U.S. might have been 
longer and possibly more difficult to achieve than a FTA, it might have resulted in a net 
overall benefit, not through the adoption of a CET, but due to the fact Canadian exporters 
to the US would not have had to fulfill NAFTA ROO.
13 
This experiment captures the potential gain that could have been obtained had we 
moved to a CU instead of NAFTA at the end of the 1990s.  These results have been 
simulated under the assumption of a controlled trade policy environment whereby the 
MFN tariffs used in the model are those observed in the 1990s after the implementation 
of NAFTA.   To approximate this environment, we have used data from 1997 (GTAP5, 
release 2002), which captures the implementation of NAFTA, but not the lowering of 
MFN tariffs since then.  However, MFN tariffs have been lowered since 1997 as the 
Uruguay Round (1986-1994) was progressively phased in, and an important issue is the 
impact that tariff preference erosion had on the distortionary cost of NAFTA ROO and 
therefore, on the potential benefit of adopting a CU if it was implemented in the 2000’s.      
Table 2a provides the magnitude of the effective MFN tariff barriers circa 2001 
(GTAP6, release 2006 of 2001 data) while Table 2b shows the percentage point reduction 
in these tariffs between 1997 and 2001.  The reduction in MFN tariffs implies an erosion 
of NAFTA tariff preference.  In Table 3 we compute from GTAP5 and GTAP6 databases 
the tariff preferences that Canadian exporters obtained in specific sectors, circa 1997 and 
2001.  Column 3 illustrates the magnitude of tariff preference erosion over this period 
from the Canadian point of view.  This preference erosion matters because it tends to 
reduce the efficiency (distortionary) cost of fulfilling ROO.  Actually, these costs would 
virtually disappear if tariff preferences collapsed to zero.  Indeed, why would a Canadian   17
firm, exporting to the US, bother with modifying the production process (input mix) to 
fulfill ROO (and pay the documentation cost), if the resulting gain (the tariff preference) 
was virtually zero?  In this case, even if ROO remained “on the books” of the FTA, they 
would be irrelevant because NAFTA utilization rates would tend to zero.   
We now use again our CGE modeling framework to estimate the gains of 
adopting a North American CU in the current environment of lower tariff preferences.  
This should demonstrate the impact of tariff preference erosion on regional trade 
agreements and that NAFTA ROO have become somewhat less distortionary than in the 
1990s because MFN tariffs have been reduced since NAFTA implementation.  
  From Figure 5, we indeed see that although the gains of moving to a CU remain 
significant – a permanent yearly increase in real GDP by 0.5%, most of it originating in 
the elimination of ROO – they are significantly smaller than what Canadians would have 
obtained had MFN tariffs remained constant at their level when NAFTA was 
implemented (Figure 4).  Note, however, that Mexico would see a permanent increase in 
its GDP by 2.9% and, recalling that a North American vision is also about devising “good 
neighbor” policy, then, this is far from being trivial.  
Clearly, if the process of multilateral MFN liberalization is pursued, the additional 
gains that could be captured (essentially due to ROO elimination) for moving from 
NAFTA to a CU would also continue to plummet, simply because NAFTA ROO or the 
CU itself, would become economically irrelevant as tariff preference utilization would 
fall to zero. This naturally leads us to the second (indirect) policy option with regard to 
ROO -- to pursue multilateral trade negotiations within the WTO and reduce most 
favored nations (MFN) tariffs towards zero.       18
What then would be the gain for Canada of living in a multilateral free trade 
world?   Table 4 provides a summary of the long term impacts on selected (real) variables 
of different counterfactual scenarios implemented at different period of time (circa 1997 
and circa 2001).  Our simulations show that if all countries in the world had been 
pursuing MFN tariff liberalization by multilaterally pushing their MFN tariffs to zero 
circa 1997, then Canada could have reaped an additional yearly gain of 1.2% of GDP 
(from the relevant 1997 benchmark).  MFN tariff have been reduced between 1997 and 
2001, but countries did not achieve full tariff liberalization.  Full tariff liberalization in 
the 2000s could still brought an additional yearly gain of 0.3% of GDP (from the 2001 
NAFTA benchmark) that is, less than if Canada negotiated a CU with the U.S. that also 
liberalizes ROO (0.5% of GDP).  This result begs two questions:  1. Why is it that a 
multilateral free trade world is usually considered the first best policy by economists if, 
as our simulation results show, Canada stands to gain more by moving to a CU with the 
U.S.?, and 2. Why do free-trade economists put so much emphasis on the importance of 
free-trade if the magnitude of the gain to be recouped is somewhat unspectacular (0.3% 
of GDP)?  
The response to the first question is linked to the standards of measures of gains 
following a policy change.  Economists tend to focus on welfare, which essentially is a 
measure of real consumption, whereas policy makers are more likely to focus on GDP.   
Our simulations indeed show that Canadian real consumption would permanently be 
higher by 0.3% under the multilateral free trade arrangement than under a CU with the 
U.S. so that multilateral free trade is indeed the first best policy according to economists.  
Canadians are likely to gain from a terms of trade appreciation as the price of their   19
imports is likely to fall in such a multilateral free trade environment.  However, a terms 
of trade appreciation also means that Canada need not export as much as before to 
finance the same volume of imports.  Therefore, concomitantly with the increase in real 
consumption, real net export would decrease (see Table 4), which might lead to a 
somewhat subdued increase in GDP in this scenario relative to the CU scenario.   
As for the second question, an increase in GDP by 0.3% (or an increase in real 
consumption by 0.3%) does not appear, at first sight, to warrant the passionate arguments 
of economists in favor of a multilateral free trade world.  So, why do economists insist on 
the benefit of multilateral free trade?  The key point is that Canada has already captured 
most of the gains of living in a freer trade world by lowering MFN tariffs for manufacture 
goods to negligible levels after seven successive multilateral trade negotiations under the 
auspices of the GATT.  But some countries still impose relatively high MFN tariffs on 
others (see Table 2a); in particular, many less developed countries stand to benefit greatly 
from a multilateral free trade world by reducing their MFN tariffs to zero.  For example, 
in our simulations, MERCOSUR and Latin America would see a permanent increase in 
their GDP by 2.8 and 3.8%. 
Table 4 shows another interesting aspect of our simulation results: real investment 
and with it the stock of capital in Canada would tend to fall if a CU was implemented 
unlike the multilateral free trade scenario.
14  Indeed, NAFTA inflates, in an inefficient 
way, the capital-value added demanded in Canada in order to satisfy ROO, while their 
elimination under a CU would lead firms to purchase intermediaries from the rest of the 
world (which embodies rest of the world capital) so that less capital would be required 
domestically.    20
Table 5 illustrates the percentage change in sectoral output when adopting the 
counterfactual policy of a CU, in the 1990s, in the 2000s, and of a multilateral free trade 
world in those same periods.  Analysing the sectoral impact of a CU that also liberalises 
ROO is a difficult task. Removing NAFTA ROO eliminates the implicit subsidy on 
Canadian intermediary goods and lowers the price of Canadian final goods. Given the 
input-output principles on which CGE analysis is based, all eight sectors in our analysis 
are both final goods and intermediaries used in the production of other sectors.  Canadian 
sectors of production will be negatively affected by the removal of ROO when their 
production is used as intermediaries while positively affected when their production is for 
final uses.  
Accordingly, note the negative impact on the resource sector (-6.1%) and the 
upsurge of the automobile (+15.6%) and the machinery and equipment (high tech) 
(+3.1%) sectors in Table 5b.  All sectors of the economy use resources intensively as an 
intermediary good.  Therefore, as suggested above, the removal of ROO induces strong 
substitution towards non-NAFTA resources, which has a negative impact on the 
Canadian resource sector.  The sectors of automobile and machinery and equipment are 
characterized by intensive use of intermediaries and they gain from a CU that also 
liberalizes ROO as they are in position to buy cheaper intermediaries from the rest of the 
world and thus improving their efficiency. 
The multilateral trade liberalization scenario (Table 5d), on the other hand, is a 
policy that would generate a strong negative impact on the Canadian textile and clothing 
industry and, at the same time, a strong positive impact on the agricultural sector.  This 
result can intuitively be explained on the basis of the existing structure of MFN tariffs   21
(Table 2a) which shows that Europe and the Rest of the World (ROW) still have higher 
trade barriers on agriculture, so that a full liberalization is likely to hurt European (and 
ROW) agriculture sectors while favoring Canadian agriculture.   
A key message that we also want to emphasize from the analysis is the large 
discrepancy in sectoral results between a CU scenario that also liberalizes ROO and the 
multilateral tariff liberalization scenario.  This (indirectly) shows that ROO liberalization 
has not much to do with tariff liberalization per se and that analyses trying to capture the 
impacts of ROO by using a “tariff-equivalent” methodology to such rules are likely to be 
misguided.       
5.  Conclusion: Policy Options for Canada 
For pragmatic trade policy makers, preferential ROO represent a sort of pact with 
the devil.  The backing of their supporters is often needed for an FTA to become law.  
But, as aptly pointed out by Destler (2006), “if ROO seem politically necessary in the 
short run, they are pernicious in the longer run.  So the question for pragmatic trade-
expanders is the ancient one: Can one dicker with the devil without joining him in Hell?”   
What thus are the options for Canadian policy makers? The analysis above 
suggests two alternatives.  Either they should concentrate their time and effort on 
establishing a CU with the U.S. and reap the additional yearly gain of 0.5% GDP, or they 
might want to concentrate their effort at the WTO table, on multilateral negotiations, to 
pursue MFN tariffs liberalization.  According to our simulations, Canada could reap an 
additional yearly gain of 0.3% of GDP if all countries in the world where multilaterally 
pushing their MFN tariffs to zero, that is, less than if Canada followed the CU policy   22
option that also liberalizes ROO.  Furthermore, the current stalemate at the WTO Doha 
round suggests that a North American CU remains a serious policy option.  
Finally, such an arrangement should not exacerbate the fears of some observers 
that this might be done at the expense of Canada’s trade relationships with other 
countries.  Georges (2008b) shows that a CU that also liberalises ROO could intensify 
trade relationships between Canada and countries from outside North America while 
somewhat reducing the overall trade flows between Canada and the US.
15  Indeed, 
Canadian firms could purchase intermediaries where they are the cheapest, lowering their 
unit cost of production and enhancing their competitiveness, which would induce further 
exports towards all countries in the world. 
Negotiating directly a North American CU with the U.S. is likely to be politically 
and diplomatically costly for Canada, although we argue that the time currently spent on 
the unfocused Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America or in other forums is 
probably as costly, albeit hardly as economically rewarding.  An important challenge of 
negotiating a North American CU involves harmonizing trade policy.  One of the thornier 
issues, as mentioned by Meilke, Rude and Zahniser (2008) would be the many different 
FTAs that the NAFTA members have negotiated separately (Figure 1).  A full North 
American CU would require the eventual reconciliation of the ROO used in each FTA in 
Figure 1 (excluding NAFTA as NAFTA preferential ROO would no longer exist).  
Research along the lines of Gasiorek, Augier, and Lai-Tong (2007) on cumulating ROO, 
and of Cornejo and Harris (2007) on a General Origin Regime as an indispensable 
minimum to effectively interconnect existing FTAs should therefore be pursued and 
encouraged.     23
   Another (somewhat utopian) venue would be to focus discussions, under the 
WTO auspice, to outlaw FTAs that are not CU.  This would require a revision of Article 
24 of the GATT which is the legal loophole through which the genie of the bottle escaped 
to fulfill the wishes of the E.U. and the U.S.
16   This would put pressures on the U.S. (and 
the E.U.) to recast their international trade policy that led to the current pandemic of 
overlapping FTAs, and which, clearly, is not in the advantage of Canada.    24
Table 1: NAGOS
®: The North American Game of Scrabble 
“Spelling new Acronyms that purport to be Initiatives” 
 
          N         
      F    A         
    N  A  E  C         
      S    C  T  P  A  T 
I  B  E  T  S        C   
        P  4  P    E   
    P  I  P           
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Table 2a: Effective MFN Tariffs (in %) imposed on a specific sector of country i by 





j  Agri Reso Food Text Manu  Tech Auto Serv 
CAN  USA  0.0  0.0  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
CAN  MEX  0.8  0.0  15.0  0.5  0.8  0.3  0.6  0.0 
CAN  MER  4.6  0.1  13.6  17.0  8.0  12.9  9.4  0.0 
CAN  LAT  9.3  2.9  19.7  12.1  8.0  7.8  13.8  0.0 
CAN  EUR  3.2  0.0  14.9  8.3  1.3  1.2  1.6  0.0 
CAN  ROW  27.0  1.2  28.0  9.5  3.8  5.6  7.1  0.0 
USA CAN  1.5 0.0  13.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
USA MEX  11.3  0.4 5.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.0 
USA MER  4.6  0.4 15.0  17.1  10.9  11.6 4.3  0.0 
USA LAT  10.0 7.1 14.5  14.7 8.7  7.2 10.5 0.0 
USA EUR  5.3 0.2  17.0  7.2 4.9 1.0 2.6 0.0 
USA ROW  39.2 1.3 30.2  11.3 5.4  3.1  3.6  0.0 
MEX  CAN  1.1  0.0  3.3  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
MEX  USA  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
MEX  MER  9.5  3.4  17.0  16.7  11.6  14.3  24.6  0.0 
MEX  LAT  8.4  1.3  21.9  13.5  8.8  8.3  34.1  0.0 
MEX  EUR  15.2  0.0  15.8  1.6  0.3  0.1  0.6  0.0 
MEX  ROW  6.1  12.9  36.2  8.7  5.4  3.5  9.4  0.0 
MER CAN  0.4 0.0  12.7  7.4 0.7 0.5 3.9 0.0 
MER USA  5.7 0.1 8.2 7.3 2.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 
MER MEX  16.7 12.4 42.0 18.2 13.7 14.2 18.2  0.0 
MER LAT  10.4 6.4 11.3  11.4 7.5  7.0 16.4 0.0 
MER EUR  6.7 0.1  25.2  3.8 1.4 0.1 1.2 0.0 
MER ROW  62.9 1.5 19.0 5.6  5.8  7.4 18.8 0.0 
LAT  CAN  0.7  0.0  3.5  15.5  0.2  0.1  1.5  0.0 
LAT  USA  0.7  0.0  4.8  11.5  0.7  0.0  0.1  0.0 
LAT  MEX  10.9  3.3  7.3  12.5  3.7  5.9  13.3  0.0 
LAT  MER  4.0  1.6  11.2  12.9  8.3  13.4  10.7  0.0 
LAT  EUR  23.8  0.1  21.6  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.1  0.0 
LAT  ROW  7.6  8.4  14.7  10.0  3.3  3.0  6.3  0.0 
EUR CAN  2.1 0.0  18.1  10.8  2.2 1.3 2.3 0.0 
EUR USA  1.9 0.0 3.8 8.5 2.1 1.0 1.5 0.0 
EUR MEX  13.5 12.3 28.4 25.5 13.7 12.5 16.9  0.0 
EUR MER  6.7 3.1  14.6  18.2  11.0  13.1  12.1  0.0 
EUR LAT  7.1 12.3  18.3  13.5 9.1  7.5 13.2 0.0 
EUR ROW  12.7 2.9 20.7  10.9 6.5  5.1  9.3  0.0 
ROW  CAN  0.8  0.0  12.3  14.2  1.8  0.7  5.1  0.0 
ROW  USA  2.3  0.0  3.6  11.9  1.7  0.8  2.2  0.0 
ROW  MEX  11.6  6.7  30.4  27.1  15.3  9.8  17.7  0.0 
ROW  MER  9.4  0.1  13.1  19.1  8.3  13.2  19.8  0.0 
ROW  LAT  8.8  4.3  15.3  13.0  9.7  8.6  13.8  0.0 
ROW  EUR  5.8  0.1  18.9  4.6  1.8  0.9  3.2  0.0 
Source: Compilation by author, based on GTAP6.  
Note on abbreviations:  agriculture (Agri); resource sector (Reso); food processing (Food); 
textiles and clothing (Text); manufactures excluding machinery and equipment (Manu); 
machinery and equipment (Tech); automotives (Auto); services (Serv). 
Canada (CAN); United States of America (USA); Mexico (MEX); Mercosur (MER); Latin 
America (LAT); Europe (EUR); Rest of the World (ROW).  
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Table 2b: Percentage point differences between 2001 and 1997 on effective MFN 
tariffs imposed on a specific sector of country i by country j 





j  Agri Reso Food Text  Manu  Tech Auto Serv 
CAN  USA  4.4  0.0  7.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
CAN  MEX  32.9  0.0  19.2  -0.5  -0.8  -0.3  -0.6  0.0 
CAN  MER  2.2  0.1  6.7  -1.4  0.1  1.2  2.9  0.0 
CAN  LAT  3.0  5.8  -1.7  3.8  -0.6  2.1  11.6  1.8 
CAN  EUR  27.8  0.3  33.3  -0.1  0.8  2.3  1.3  0.0 
CAN  ROW  39.3  0.0  5.9  3.0  -0.2  0.1  -0.9  0.4 
USA CAN  2.7  0.0 11.9 0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
USA MEX  5.7  -0.4 27.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 
USA MER  2.2 -0.1 1.6 -0.4 -0.4 1.9 12.2 0.0 
USA LAT  0.0 0.7 2.7 7.6 1.2 1.8 2.4 2.7 
USA EUR  7.4  0.3 10.0 1.4 -1.5 2.2  0.5  0.0 
USA ROW  5.9  0.5 10.2 1.0  0.4  1.5  0.6  0.2 
MEX  CAN  0.9  0.0  28.2  -1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
MEX  USA  8.3  0.0  8.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
MEX  MER  0.7  -2.0  -0.1  -0.4  -1.5  0.1  11.7  0.0 
MEX  LAT  3.8  3.6  -5.6  -0.6  0.2  2.6  -17.2  1.9 
MEX  EUR  3.1  0.0  15.2  7.5  3.4  3.6  4.6  0.0 
MEX  ROW  18.8  -11.1  4.5  3.0  1.6  -0.1  2.9  0.2 
MER CAN  1.6 0.0 5.0 4.1 3.4 2.1 -0.6 0.0 
MER USA  10.4  0.4 7.3 0.2 0.9 1.4 1.0 0.0 
MER MEX  -9.7 -2.6  -20.7  -6.6 -4.3 -2.6 -4.9 0.0 
MER LAT  0.5 3.7 3.5 1.9 2.7 2.0 0.2 2.1 
MER EUR  1.1 0.1 6.7 1.6 2.8 3.0 5.2 0.0 
MER ROW  -21.0 0.3 15.5 2.9 -0.7 -0.3 -4.2 0.3 
LAT  CAN  1.6  0.0  20.5  4.6  1.6  3.4  2.5  0.0 
LAT  USA  12.7  0.4  13.2  3.0  1.8  3.5  1.2  0.0 
LAT  MEX  1.1  6.3  17.1  8.3  4.4  7.6  0.3  0.0 
LAT  MER  3.8  2.0  3.9  4.3  -0.4  4.7  7.7  0.0 
LAT  EUR  -13.5  0.3  20.9  8.7  2.1  3.1  1.0  0.0 
LAT  ROW  25.4  -7.1  11.8  0.4  -0.4  2.7  -4.2  0.2 
EUR CAN  2.6  0.0 31.8 4.1  2.1  1.5  0.3  0.0 
EUR USA  8.6 0.4 5.0 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.5 0.0 
EUR MEX  -7.9 -4.7 1.6 -3.2 -4.1 -3.7 -4.1 0.0 
EUR MER  3.1 -0.7 3.2 -2.3 -0.2 1.1 10.0 0.0 
EUR LAT  -0.1 -5.0 -0.1 1.0 0.7 1.7 -1.3 2.1 
EUR ROW  11.1 1.6 16.8 4.1  2.1  2.0  2.4  0.2 
ROW  CAN  2.7  0.0  10.4  4.4  3.0  1.3  1.1  0.0 
ROW  USA  12.3  0.4  8.6  1.4  1.1  1.0  0.4  0.0 
ROW  MEX  -1.1  -0.1  1.4  -5.8  -4.8  0.3  -3.4  0.0 
ROW  MER  -0.6  4.3  3.6  0.6  2.0  1.0  14.6  0.0 
ROW  LAT  3.3  0.6  3.3  0.3  1.0  1.3  1.2  2.1 
ROW  EUR  4.4  0.0  21.7  6.0  1.8  3.0  3.5  0.0 
Source: Compilation by author, based on GTAP5 and GTAP6.  
 
 
   27








Agri  9.4 1.8 7.6 
Reso  0.4 0.0 0.4 
Food  3.2 2.4 0.8 
Text  12.9 11.4  1.5 
Manu  2.9 1.8 1.1 
Tech  1.9 0.9 1.0 
Auto  2.3 1.8 0.5 
Serv  0 0  0.0 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GTAP 5 and GTAP 6 databases. 
Table 4: Long term impacts (% change from benchmark) on selected variables for 
different counterfactual scenarios implemented at different periods of time  
 











circa 1997  13.8  12.7  0.3  -0.7  0.9 
ROO only  
circa 1997  10.6 9.8  0.3  -0.7 0.7 
CET only  
circa 1997  2.2 2.1  0.1  -0.1 0.1 
MFN=0 
circa 1997  12.1 13.5  1.2  2.0  1.2 
CU  
circa 2001  10.2  9.9  0.0  -0.6  0.5 
ROO only  
circa 2001  9.1 8.7  0.1  -0.6 0.4 
CET only  
circa 2001  0.8 0.8  0.0  -0.1 0.0 
MFN=0 
circa 2001  5.0  5.7  0.3  0.5  0.3 
Source: Author’ simulations.  











   28
Table 5: Sectoral output (% change from benchmark) for different counterfactual 
scenarios implemented at different periods of time 
(5a) 
CU  
circa 1997  CAN USA  MEX  MER  LAT  EUR  ROW 
agri  2.6  0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 
reso  -6.8  0.1 1.5 0.4 1.1 2.0 0.1 
food  -6.7 0.0  -0.6  0.0  0.2  0.8  0.1 
text  -2.7 -0.8  10.7  0.1 -0.9 0.2 0.1 
manu  1.7  -0.2 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.2 0.1 
tech  6.4 0.0  16.3  -0.2  -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 
auto  20.5 -3.6  21.3  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.9 




circa 2001  CAN USA  MEX  MER  LAT  EUR  ROW 
agri  0.1 0.3  -1.2  -0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 
reso  -6.1  0.5 2.5 -0.3 0.4 1.8 0.0 
food  -2.1 0.0  -0.5  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.2 
text  -1.0  -1.0 8.1 0.1 -1.6 0.5 0.2 
manu  0.8  -0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 
tech  3.1 -0.2  14.6  -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 
auto  15.6 -3.5  29.6  5.7  6.1  0.3  0.2 




Circa 1997  CAN USA  MEX  MER  LAT  EUR  ROW 
agri  88.2 26.7  1.8  15.2 22.8 -4.9 -5.2 
reso  -2.5  -1.5 2.6 1.7 8.1 0.0 2.1 
food  1.8 8.5  3.2  14.4 24.8  -2.5  1.8 
text  -27.9  -21.3  -11.8 -0.9 17.6 -2.1 17.0 
manu  -0.8  0.5 2.9 0.8 4.5 2.7 1.9 
tech  -1.5  0.4 4.6 -6.6  -2.1 3.0 3.7 
auto  -2.3 -2.7  13.7  -9.8 -20.7 5.5  5.8 




Circa 2001  CAN USA  MEX  MER  LAT  EUR  ROW 
agri  22.1 22.2  -1.1 46.8 17.5 -5.3 -4.3 
reso  0.4 -0.6  6.8  -3.1 12.1 -1.2  1.1 
food  1.3  5.1  1.5 15.7 9.0 -1.7 0.5 
text  -21.9  -20.6  -11.4  -4.0 19.6 1.7 13.5 
manu  0.6  0.8 2.7 -1.1 2.4 1.7 1.5 
tech  0.9  0.0 9.5  -10.2  0.5 2.5 2.0 
auto  0.5 -2.7  17.6  -6.7 -8.5 3.8  4.3 
serv  0.1  0.2 0.6 1.2 1.3 0.0 0.4 
Source: Author’ simulations.   29




































Dashed lines: Signed only 
Solid lines: Ratified/Implemented 
Sources:  Robson (2007), based on: World Trade Law.Net, Office of U.S. Trade 
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Figure 5:  % increase in real Canadian GDP if we wanted to negotiate a North 
American Customs Union in the 2000s
















Source: Author’s simulations 
Figure 4:  % increase in real Canadian GDP if we had negotiated a North 
American Customs Union instead of NAFTA in the 1990s 
















Source: Georges (2008b)   32
References 
Anson, J., O. Cadot, A. Estevadeordal, J. de Melo, A. Suwa-Eisenmann, and B. Tumurchudur, 
“Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application 
to NAFTA,” Review of International Economics 13 (2005):501-17.  
Bhagwati, J., “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview,” in Jaime de Melo and Arvind 
Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 22-51, 1993.  
Bhagwati, J., Termites in the Trading Systems – How preferential Agreements Undermine Free 
Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.   
Brown, D., Deardorff, A., and Stern, R. (2001).  Impact on NAFTA members of multilateral and 
regional trading arrangements and tariff harmonization. In R. Harris (Ed.), North 
American linkages: Opportunities and challenges for Canada.  Calgary, AB: University 
of Calgary Press. 
Cadot, O., J. de Melo, A. Estevadeordal, A. Suwa-Eisenmann, and B. Tumurchudur, “Assessing 
the Effect of NAFTA’s Rules of Origin,” Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée, INRA 
Research Unit Working Papers 0306 (2002). 
Cadot, O., Estevadeordal, A., Suwa-Eisenmann, A., and Verdier, T. (2006). (Eds.) The origin of 
goods: Rules of origin in regional trade agreements.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
Cornejo, R. and J. Harris (2007) “Convergence in the Rules of Origin Spaghetti Bowl: A 
Methodological Proposal” Inter-American Development Bank, INTAL-INT Working 
Paper 34. 
Destler, I. M., “Rules of Origin and US Trade Policy,” in Cadot, O., Estevadeordal, A., Suwa-
Eisenmann, A., and Verdier, T. (2006). (Eds.) The origin of goods: Rules of origin in 
regional trade agreements.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.     33
Dimaranan, B. V. and R. A. McDougall (Eds.), Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The 
GTAP 5 Data Base, West Lafayette, Indiana: Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue 
University, 2002. 
Dimaranan, B. V. and R. A. McDougall (Eds.), Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The 
GTAP 6 Data Base, West Lafayette, Indiana: Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue 
University, 2006. 
Estevadeordal, A. and K. Suominen, “Mapping and measuring Rules of Origin around the world”, 
in Cadot, O., Estevadeordal, A., Suwa-Eisenmann, A., and Verdier, T. (2006). (Eds.) The 
origin of goods: Rules of origin in regional trade agreements.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.   
Francois, J., “Preferential Trade Arrangements and the Pattern of Production and Trade When 
Inputs are Differentiated,” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 072/2 (2005). 
Garay, L. J. and P. De Lombaerde, “Preferential Rules of Origin: Models and Levels of 
Rulemaking,” Paper prepared for the Brussels UNU-CRIS/LSE Workshop on The 
Interaction between Levels of Rulemaking in International Trade and Investment (2004). 
Gasiorek, M., P. Augier, and C. Lai-Tong, “Multilateralising Regionalism: Relaxing Rules of 
Origin or Can Those PECS be Flexed?”  Paper presented at the Conference on 
Multilateralising Regionalism, 10-12 September 2007, Geneva, Switzerland.  
Georges, P. (2008a). “Liberalizing NAFTA Rules of Origin: A Dynamic CGE Analysis,” Review 
of International Economics, 16 (4), 672-686. 
_________ (2008b).  “Toward a North American Customs Union:  Rules of Origin Liberalization 
Matters More than a Common External Tariff for Canada,” North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance (2008b), doi:10.1016/j.najef.2008.06.002. 
Gil, S., Llorca, R. and Martínez-Serrano, A. (2008). “Assessing the Enlargement and Deepening 
of the European Union,” The World Economy (2008): 1253-72.   34
Ghosh, M., and Rao, S. (2005). A Canada-U.S. customs union: Potential economic impacts in 
NAFTA countries. Journal of Policy Modeling, 27, 805-827. 
Goldfarb, D., “The Road to a Canada-U.S. Customs Union:  Step-by-Step or in a Single Bound?” 
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 184 (2003). 
Kemp, M., and Wan H. Jr. (1976). An elementary proposition concerning the formation of 
customs union. In M. Kemp (Ed.), Three topics in the theory of international trade: 
Distribution, welfare, and uncertainty, Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Krishna, K. (2005). Understanding rules of origin (NBER Working Paper 11150).     
Krishna, K., and Krueger, A. (1995). Implementing free trade areas: Rules of origin and hidden 
protection (NBER Working Paper No. 4983). 
Krueger, A. (1993). Free trade agreements as protectionist devices: Rules of origin (NBER 
Working Paper No. 4352). 
Krueger, A. (1995). Free trade agreements versus customs unions (NBER Working Paper No. 
5084). 
Meilke, K., J. Rude and S. Zahniser (2008).  Is NAFTA Plus an Option in the North American 
Agrifood Sector?  The World Economy (2008): 925-46.  
Pastor, R. (2008).  “The Future of North America.  Replacing a Bad neighbour Policy” Foreign 
Affairs, 87(4), 84-98.  
Pomfret, R., “Is Regionalism an Increasing Feature of the World Economy?,” The World 
Economy (2007): 923-47.  
Robson, W., “Stuck on a Spoke: Proliferating Bilateral Trade Deals are a Dangerous Game for 
Canada” C.D. Howe Institute e-Brief (2007). 
The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects -- Trade, Regionalism, and Development” (2005).  
                                                 
1 For a recent collection of papers analysing different aspects of ROO, see Cadot, Estevadeordal, Suwa-
Eisenmann, and Verdier (2006).     35
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Starting at any FTA, the theorem of Kemp and Wan (1976) ensures that there is a CU that is Pareto 
superior (to the FTA) if ROO are eliminated, but this requires to chose a CET that does not affect the terms 
of trade of the union with respect to outside countries and that member countries implement lump-sum 
transfers so that no individual member is worse off. 
3 One may wonder why the U.S. started to pursue extensive FTAs negotiation during the 1980s.  Different 
arguments have been advanced, in particular by Bhagwati (2008).  One argument is imitation of the 
European Union hub which increasingly had a number of spokes through regional FTAs.  Some of the U.S. 
trade negotiators had in mind the spectacle of the spokes voting on GATT issues with the hub and this 
might have let to the U.S. abandoning its exclusive embrace of multilateralism in free trade.  A second 
argument is that in order to respond to growing pressures from South America for debt relief, the U.S. 
responded by offering trade instead and the U.S. became a hub for some spokes.  Finally, the over-
appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the 1980s led to protectionism voices there, and the only way to 
countervail and contain the protectionists was to mobilize exporting interests by offering them markets 
abroad.  However, the Europeans and the developing countries would not agree to declaring a new 
multilateral round when the U.S. tried hard to start one in the early 1980s.  This led the U.S. to conclude 
that it was left with no option except to go the bilateral route.       
4 Krueger (1993) points that ROO can effectively extend the protection that the U.S. intermediary industry 
receives within the U.S., to Canada and Mexico, so that the ROO can be used by the U.S. to secure its 
NAFTA intermediary market for the exports of its own intermediate products.   
5 Indeed, unless CGE modellers re-calibrate their models appropriately, there is no “room” for the ROO 
distortion (that is only implicitly present in the initial benchmark database) and thus there is no way to 
remove it. 
6 A more formal presentation of the allocation between  Nafta X  and nonNafta X  where the firm must also 
choose between capital, labour, and several composite intermediary inputs, is given in Georges (2008a).   
 
7 The bias given by α represents observed data at the aggregate level.  If we had adopted the alternative 
interpretation of an institutional parameter, then the issue of whether the ROO is strictly binding or not   36
                                                                                                                                                 
would matter and detailed information on firms’ use of NAFTA preferences would be relevant. For 
example, according to Goldfarb (2003), in 2002, 55% of total value of U.S. imports from Canada entered 
under the NAFTA regime and 45% entered at MFN rates.  Goldfarb also notices a large inter-sectoral 
difference in NAFTA utilization rates.  Our approach, however, has the advantage to avoid both the 
complication of whether the ROO is strictly binding or not and the problem of heterogeneous behaviour of 
firms with respect to ROO.  In particular, we can assume a ‘representative’ firm in each sector of the 
economy.  The representative firm may therefore be thought of as an “average” of numerous different types 
of firms with heterogeneous positions with respect to the sectoral ROO.   
8 The calibration procedure consists of fitting the model to the database, which implies that the choice of 
the distribution parameters of the CES function in equation (1) must be done so that if the modeler 
“simulates” a parameterized model without shock, and assuming cost minimizing behaviour given a set of 
prices, then he/she will be able to replicate the observed data set or benchmark (point 2). 
9 θ is a percentage increase in the average (unit) cost of production (so that it applies to each unit produced) 
whereas tariff preference only applies to the production that is exported to NAFTA countries.  Therefore, in 
order to use tariff preference as a proxy for the increase in unit cost of production, it must be weighted by 
the share of sectoral production that is exported to the NAFTA member (that provides the preference). If a 
firm sells its entire production domestically, then tariff preference per se has no value, so that the firm 
would not change its input mix and incur an increase in unit cost of production (weight = 0) in order to 
satisfy a ROO.  The weight equals 1 in the other extreme scenario of a NAFTA firm that exports all its 
production to the two other NAFTA members. 
10 Each country has eight sectors of production, all perfectly competitive.  These sectors are agriculture, 
resource sectors, food processing, textiles and clothing, manufactures excluding machinery and equipment, 
machinery and equipment, automotives, and services.  Each of these industries is assumed to produce a 
single commodity.  Trade flows among countries are organised through an Armington system.  Georges 
(2008b) describe the model in details and Georges (2008a) explains theoretically the calibration challenge. 
11  The cost of documenting ROO is not taken into account in this analysis so that our results are 
“conservative”.   37
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Observe that the full impact of a CU includes second order or “cross effects” (0.92%-0.70%-0.14%): the 
removal of NAFTA ROO per se modifies trade patterns between NAFTA and non-NAFTA countries.  
Therefore, second-order effects measure the impact that the adoption of a CET might also have on this new 
pattern of trade due to the ROO removal, with repercussions on all variables in the model.  As these cross 
effects are relatively small we will not discuss them further. 
13 Even a CET set equal to the U.S. MFN tariffs (to avoid a lengthy negotiation process with the U.S.) is 
likely to generate much lobbying, negotiation, and opposition.  Industries where Canadian MFN tariffs 
have to be reduced to U.S. levels are likely to oppose such a move.  Furthermore, foreigners are likely to 
oppose any upward adjustment of Canadian to U.S. MFN levels, which would violate the WTO and trigger 
retaliation or require compensation.    
14 Table 4 reports steady state (long term) results.  In our model, steady state investment is equal to the 
depreciation of the stock of capital.  Therefore, a decline in real investment (by 0.7%) translates in a lower 
steady state stock of capital in Canada.   
15 This result is in stark contrast to the study of Gil and al. (2008) which, using gravity equations, shows a 
gradual increase in trade intensity among European countries as they evolved from an FTA to a CU.  
However, these results might be obscured, as mentioned by the authors, by the role of phase-in periods.         
16 This would require a stricter mandate for the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements which is 
charged to examine whether preferential trade agreements are compatible with Article 24. 